Unused tech can manipulate market fairness.
The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.
New tech can manipulate markets even if unused.
'Poisoned Apple Effect' highlights regulatory vulnerabilities.
Strategic tech release can shift market dynamics.
Focus on specific game-theoretic settings.
Simulated environments may not fully capture real-world complexity.
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